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Big Data Policing and the Redistribution of Anxiety
Kiel Brennan-Marquez*
I.
By equipping police with data, what are we trying to accomplish? Certain
answers ring familiar. For one thing, we are trying to make criminal justice
decisions, plagued as they often are by inaccuracy and bias, more refined.' For
another, we are trying to boost the efficiency of governance institutions-police
departments, prosecutor's offices, municipal courts-that operate under the pall of
scarcity.
For the moment, I want to put answers like these to one side; not because they
are wrong, but because they seem like only part of the story. Another goal of big
data policing, 2 in addition to those just described, is to produce a social order-a
surveillance society-in which people constantly monitor and curate the data-trails
they leave behind in everyday life. The idea of self-monitoring in response to
surveillance is not new. Data intensifies and extends this dynamic; it does not
create the dynamic ex nihilo. But the fact remains: in both scale and scope, data
surveillance today lacks meaningful precedent. We are fast approaching a world in
which virtually everything one does at t,--every movement one makes in public,
every bond one forges on social media, every transaction one participates in-will
be recorded and archived, becoming a potential foundation for adverse treatment at
*

t2

Yes, there will continue to be limits on the ability of police to collect data, and
yes, use-restrictions may be imposed, to greater or lesser practical effect, on data
already in hand. But the endgame is not hard to see. Given enough sensors,

*
Research Fellow & Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. Associate
Professor of Law, University of Connecticut, beginning August 2018. I would like to thank Ric
Simmons for inviting me to participate in this splendid symposium, as well as the editors of the Ohio
State Journalof Criminal Law for helping to get this essay into publishable shape.
I Numerous symposium papers touch on this theme. See, e.g., Bennett Capers, TechnoPolicing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 495 (2018); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Illuminating Black Data
Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRI. L. 503 (2018); Ravi Shroff, Statistical Tests to Audit Investigative

Stops, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 565 (2018).
2
Here, and throughout the essay, I am adopting Andrew Ferguson's phrase (and drawing
inspiration from his work). See ANDREw GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING:
SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2017).
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enough computational power, enough channels of data "insourcing,"' enough time,
and traditional safeguards will run dry. Long term, we cannot hope to curb the
psychological effects of totalizing data surveillance.4
Those effects are best conveyed, I think, by a label the Supreme Court itself
recently adopted to describe information privacy harms: anxiety. The organizing
principle of a surveillance society like the one just described-the one we
increasingly inhabit-is constant, low-level consternation about the way one's
activity may be perceived by those in power. The paradigm, you could say, is that
of a routine, not-yet-escalated traffic stop. As police enjoy access to more and
more data, individuals will increasingly stand, at all times, in relation to the state
the way someone who has been pulled over, awaiting a license-and-registration
check, does: in a slight-but-taxing state of worry, cautiously hoping that everything
will be fine. Or maybe the paradigm is slightly less dramatic: seeing a patrol car in
your rear-view mirror and feeling your pulse quicken; awareness heightened and
senses alert, as you try not to break any traffic rules. (Good luck.)
Cast in this light, the distinctive feature of big data policing-beyond its
statistical promise-is that it multiplies, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the
experience of being subject to "police presence." Once all of life is documented
and databased, once officials can make use (in Stephen Henderson's words) of
"time machines," 6 officers no longer need to be investigating contemporaneously,
let alone physically present, to inspire self-monitoring and behavior modification.
The logic here is essentially panoptic: a technologically-updated version of
Bentham's idealized prison. Even if no guards currently occupy in the central
tower, even if no guards ever occupy the central tower, so long as each cell is fitted
with sensors that record all aspects of the daily life and the records are always
available for review-a rough analogy to totalizing data surveillance-the
disciplining effects will be the same. In many ways, this simple insight is the
See Kimberly N. Brown, Outsourcing, Data Insourcing, and the Irrelevant Constitution,
49
GA. L. REv. 607 (2015) (examining the ways in which outsourcing of government functions, paired

with "data insourcing" by state agencies, permits the circumvention of various regulatory
mechanisms, including constitutional rules). See also Kiel Brennan-Marquez, The Constitutional
Limits ofPrivate Surveillance, 66 KAN. L. REv. 485 (2018) (exploring similar themes).
4
See, e.g., Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MIss. L.J.
1309, 1348 (2012) (arguing that we are fast approaching a future in which law enforcement is "awash
in probable cause" and the possibility of police intrusion is constant and universal).

5

See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2178 (2016) (holding that police must

obtain a warrant before performing a blood test pursuant to a DUI arrest, because more information
than BAC can be extracted from blood samples, which "may result in anxiety for the person tested");
Kiel Brennan-Marquez & Stephen E. Henderson, Fourth Amendment Anxiety, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REv.

1 (2018) (unpacking the implications ofBirchfield).
See Stephen E. Henderson, Fourth Amendment Time Machines
(And What They Might Say
About Police Body Cameras), 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 933 (2016).
6
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foundation of predictive policing. By directing officer attention to areas where
crime has been forecast as likely, the hypothesis is that we can deter wrongdoing
before it occurs. And preliminary empirics seem to bear the hypothesis out.'
To be clear, I am not saying that data surveillance is liable to make every
person feel, at every moment, exactly as they would when being directly monitored
by police. The point is that the two forms of experience-and of self-monitoring
that plausibly results from those experiences-are comparable. They occupy the
same spectrum.
II.
All this may sound grim, even fatalistic. But not so fast. Anxiety has many
benefits. It can be a wellspring of virtuous behavior-or short of that, at least
compliant behavior. The reality is that we want people to worry about breaking
the rules; just not so much that it spills over into other domains of life, hobbling
autonomy-what we say, think, and do-and frustrating democratic participation.
How exactly to strike this balance is, of course, a complex and controversial
question. For present purposes, the point is simply that low-level anxiety-as a
result of data-driven law enforcement-may not be such a bad thing, especially if
it trades off against the not-so-low-level anxiety that accompanies (1) traditional
9
And the point is not just
policing, as well as (2) the absence of police.
in certain pathologies of
rein
to
stand
quantitative. Not only does big data policing
law enforcement; it promises-at least in principle-to do so in progressive ways.
In other words, the anxiety produced by big data policing has the capacity to -be
redistributive:to impose a small burden on a large swath of the population instead
of imposing an outsized burden on specific communities where law enforcement
harms have traditionally run rampant.
Of course, I'm painting a consciously abstract-and idealized-picture.
Data-driven solutions are not inherently more progressive (in a distributional
sense) than their traditional counterparts. If anything, the practical tendency is
often the opposite.10 The point is simply that data-driven anxiety plausibly could
be more equally dispersed than the anxiety wrought by traditional policing. And as
See, e.g., Samantha Melamed, Can Atlantic City's Bold Experiment Take Racial Bias Out
of Predictive Policing?, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 10, 2017, 5:03 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/
news/crime/atlantic-city-risk-terrain-modeling-rutgers-predictive-policing-joel-caplan-20170810.html
[https://perma.cc/H8MIX-MVVB].
8 For a fuller discussion of these kinds of chilling effects as the central risk of data-driven
law enforcement, see Brennan-Marquez, supra note 3.
9 Among criminal justice reformers, it has long been a maxim that in many places, the only
thing worse than too much policing is too little.
10

See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 1.

490

OHIO STATE JOURINAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol. 15:487

scholars, advocates, and judges craft doctrinal responses to big data policing, it
should be with its redistributive potential in mind.
Specifically, there are (at least) two forms of "anxiety redistribution" that big
data policing might accomplish. The first is to curb false-positives, which could
occur in numerous ways. For one thing, data can discourage police from relying
on bias, conscious or unconscious, to guide their decisions. To borrow an example
from Bennett Capers, "the increased use of public surveillance cameras and facial
recognition technology, coupled with access to Big Data and perhaps terahertz
scanners capable of distance scanning for firearms, could do much [to] tackl[e] the
... problem [of] racialized policing,"" and disrupt the "young plus black equals
probable cause" equation that stands a shameful hallmark of much contemporary
policing.12 For another thing, data analysis might facilitate changes in the
allocation of police resources (say, where officers are dispatched for patrol) or the
adoption of police tactics, based on historical crime patterns and efficacy rates.
The second form of "anxiety redistribution" is even simpler: big data tactics
could displace older policing methods and/or preempt more crime. As police rely
more on data, they may rely less on intrusive tactics like stop and frisk, or
relatedly, they may find more efficient ways to deter low-level crime-or both.
To reiterate: nothing about the logic or practice of data-driven law
enforcement makes these redistributive impulses necessary. On the contrary, they
will be hard fought-and particularly in our current political climate, unlikely. In
an ideal world, however, they would be the lodestar of academic and judicial
efforts toward reform.
HI.
Ultimately, then, the question is how best to manage the anxiety that
accompanies big data policing-how to capitalize on its capacity both to deter
crime and to displace more intrusive forms of police work, while keeping its darker
externalities at bay. This, needless to say, is an enormous question. For now, I
wish simply to call attention to one aspect of existing Fourth Amendment law that
is plainly not up to the task: the idea that suspicion benchmarks will suffice, in the
future, to limit police discretion.
Although this danger has not been lost on commentators,1 3 I fear its gravity
has been undersold. The problem is not merely, as scholars like Andrew Ferguson
"

Capers, supra note 1, at 497.

12 Id. (citing Elizabeth A. Gaynes, The Urban CriminalJustice System: Where Young + Black
+ Male = Probable Cause, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 621 (1992)).
13

See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable
Suspicion, 163

U. PA. L. REV. 327 (2015); Ohm, supranote 4.

2018]

BIG DATA POLICING AND THE REDISTRIBUTION OF ANXIETY

491

(rightly) note,1 4 that in a data-rich world reasonable suspicion and probable cause
will be much easier, perhaps even trivially easy, to satisfy. The problem is that,
going forward, even near-perfect knowledge of wrongdoing may not be enough to
justify intrusion. If the Fourth Amendment's purpose is to constrain the functional
discretion that state officials enjoy when enforcing the law-and there is ample
15
evidence to support this proposition -big data policing may demand full-blown
overhaul, not just reform.
Why? Because historically, Fourth Amendment doctrine has been able to rely
on a natural synergy between (1) suspicion benchmarks, which require police to be
able to explain their targeting decisions ex ante, and (2) anti-discretion principles.
Demanding the former-requiring the police to build a "mini-case" in advance of
intrusion-effectively vindicated the latter. Today, however, this synergy is
poised to unravel. In a data-rich world, the police will soon find themselves (to
16
borrow a phrase from Paul Ohm) "awash in probable cause," and the question
should be whether they can justify their investigative activity on freestanding
17
"reasonableness" grounds. Furthermore, the problem cannot be solved by simply
ratcheting up the amount of suspicion required to establish probable cause (or,
depending on the setting, reasonable suspicion). That approach, though laudable,
and perhaps appealing on incrementalist grounds, would ultimately just delay the
inevitable. Eventually, we will have to confront the question of what requirements
the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" mandate imposes on top of traditional
suspicion benchmarks.
At risk of belaboring the point, consider a hypothetical. Suppose the NYPD
develops a tool called the Pot Detector, which allows officers to stand outside a
townhouse or apartment building, point the device toward the specific unit, and
obtain a hyper-precise prediction ("yes" / "no") of whether the unit contains at
18
least some amount of marijuana. In other words, the Pot Detector operates like a
See Ferguson, supra note 13.
See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, "Plausible Cause": Explanatory Standards in the Age of
PowerfulMachines, 70 VAND. L. REv. 1249, 1288-95 (2017).
16 Ohm, supra note 4.
17
For an analysis that touches on the theme of reasonableness above and beyond probable
cause, see Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized
Point of a "Pointless Dignity," 66 STAN. L. REv. 987, 995 (2014) (arguing for "a hybridized-or
two-ply-reasonableness test, whereby an arrest must be supported by both probable cause and
general reasonableness").
14
15

Cf JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS Ill, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES,
'
POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 43 (5th ed. 2012) (imagining a "'radar' gun" that "can be tuned so that it
will only signal the existence of substances that cannot be legally possessed under federal law" and
exploring the issues this kind of device would raise). See also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
if a device were
109, 138 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[U]nder the Court's analysis ...
developed that, when aimed at a person, would detect instantaneously whether the person is carrying
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radar gun; homing in on marijuana, it yields the correct prediction in virtually
every case. The question is: should a "yes" output from the Pot Detector suffice to
warrant a search of the unit? Traditionally, the answer would clearly be
affirmative. The police all but know the unit contains pot. Surely that is
sufficient-indeed, beyond sufficient-to establish probable cause.' 9
Yet imagine the discretion this would give police! The NYPD would be
effectively free to choose among all residences flagged "yes" on the Pot Detector,
and perform intrusive searches wherever they wanted. Maybe-hopefully-they
would wield this power responsibly. But the whole point of the Fourth
Amendment is that police are not allowed to wield power unsupervised; courts
must be involved. And to the extent that technologies like the Pot Detector (or its
real-world, algorithmic equivalent) allow police to bypass judicial supervision,
they should be cause for constitutional concern.
I realize the Pot Detector is hyperbolic and reductive. But that's the point. As
a thought-experiment, it underscores a limitation of using suspicion benchmarks
like "probable cause" as tools for constraining law enforcement power. The
premise of this approach is that police operatefrom a default position of ignorance
about crime, from which it follows that requiring police to devise ex ante suspicion
will circumscribe their power. But as the premise falters, so does the conclusion.
IV.
In a brilliant and provocative essay published under this very masthead a few
years back, Paul Butler argued that stop and frisk programs are best understood by

cocaine, there would be no Fourth Amendment bar, under the Court's approach, to the police setting
up such a device on a street corner and scanning all passersby. In fact, the Court's analysis is so
unbounded that if a device were developed that could detect, from the outside of a building, the
presence of cocaine inside, there would be no constitutional obstacle to the police cruising through a
residential neighborhood and using the device to identify all homes in which the drug is present.").
Note that I am putting to one side the question of whether using the Pot Detector would qualify as a
search under Kyllo v. UnitedStates, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 1 happen to think it does not, when Kyllo is
synthesized with the so-called "binary search" doctrine-suggesting that detection methods that
disclose only contraband do not qualify, in the first instance, as searches-on most prominent display
in the dog sniff cases. In other words, the Kyllo rule would not apply (or at the very least, apply for
different reasons than those articulated in Kyllo) if the "technological enhancement" in question were
precisely-tailored to contraband. Either way, the point is that we can imagine at least some methods
of "perfect detection" that (1) don't trigger Kyllo and (2) raise the concerns about discretion that I'm
flagging here.
19 Things get a little more complicated (1) if the output comes in the form of a conditional
probability rather than a binary determination, and/or (2) if the false-positive rate is high enough that
an output no longer seems to establish near-knowledge. Some of these questions are explored in
Brennan-Marquez, supra note 15, but I put them to one side here.
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analogy to torture and terror. 20 According to Butler, by detaining and harassing
people in public (more often than not, men of color), police assert a form of
control-a reminder of "who is in charge, and the violent consequences of
dissent 21-similar to low-level torture practices, such as sleep deprivation. 22 And
the result, in the aggregate, is a climate of fear and paralysis not unlike that of a
community perpetually under siege by threats of terrorism.
Whether or not one agrees with Butler's claim, the exercise his essay
instantiates and invites-drawing out the implications of extant law enforcement
practices by reference to the ghastlier modes of social control they resemble-is
quite fruitful. The difference between anxiety, on one hand, and torture and terror,
on the other, is that anxiety can coexist, in principle, with liberal democracy,
whereas torture and terror cannot. Accordingly, where the implication of Butler's
analysis is that stop and frisk programs should be abolished, the implication of my
analysis is not that big data policing must be abandoned. Rather, it's that
regulation of big data policing must vindicate the Fourth Amendment's core
promise: that citizens should be allowed to carry on with their lives, free from
undue anxiety about arbitrary intervention by the state.
Historically, this promise has often lain fallow. Fourth Amendment doctrine
has frequently served to justify police practices that are sloppy at best-and at
worst, far worse. Big data holds out the possibility of something better. But to
realize that possibility, we need legal rules that cause data to curtail, rather than
exacerbate, the traditional pathologies of policing. The fear, of course, is they will
do just the opposite.

20

Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk and Torture-Lite: Police Terror of Minority Communities, 12

OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 57, 57-58 (2014).
21

Id. at 69.

22

Id. at 61.

